Kabila co-opts the opposition to prolong a family dynasty

The highly contested elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are now over and Joseph Kabila Kabange handed over the presidency to Félix Antoine Tshilombo Tshisekedi on January 24.

Tshisekedi has been quickly recognised officially by the United States, Kenya and all the 16 Southern African Development Community member states to which the DRC belongs, among others.

Much more significantly, the internal and potentially divisive position adopted by the Catholic Church’s National Episcopal Conference of Congo has been undone because six of the eight Catholic bishops in Tshiskedi’s Kasai region have now accepted the electoral outcome, arguing that, however flawed, this is a step towards democracy and social progress for all.R

But these developments highlight the contradictions and lessons learnt from the past in at least three important aspects.

The first is that Africa is having to contend with the cohesion of elite, hereditary “republican” dynasties, which are expanding and consolidating. 
This was manifest in the temporary collaboration between the families of the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the late Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba and now in the consensus reached between Joseph Kabila and Félix Tshisekedi.

This new-found relationship is unequally balanced, with Kabila controlling the instruments of the state, including an important 300 majority of the 500 legislators in the National Assembly, complemented by Tshisekedi’s inherited national mass support and legitimacy.

The test of the collaboration will lie in how they can reach mutual agreement and common positions on the fundamental problems confronting the state, such as governance, domestic and foreign policies, management of the political economy, security and even the selection of alliance partners.

But the ultimate challenge to the new-layered hereditary dynasty is that each partner is inheriting each other’s baggage as well as being expected to respond to the expectations of each other’s constituents.

One of the early issues is Kabila’s understood intentions to run for office again in 2023. This makes it is unlikely that Kabila and his allies, such as the losing presidential candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, will go out of their way to strengthen Tshisekedi’s position and enable him to become independent of them.

Something symbolic about this fraught collaboration occurred during the inauguration. Kabila’s handlers had tightened the visible body armour on Tshisekedi to such extent that he couldn’t breathe properly and nearly collapsed; it had to be loosened to enable him to complete his inaugural speech.R

The second salutary lesson is the confirmation that, actually, elections do not matter for succession in the DRC. Consider the flawed elections in July 2006, in November 2011, the Catholic bishops conference-negotiated December 2016 extension (on the basis of which Kabila could prepare the country for elections) and the recent December 2018 polls.

In the midst of the most recent electoral crisis, the African Union, at its summit this month, issued a communiqué requesting the DRC to delay announcing the result until the AU could deploy a special intervention and conflict resolution team from its headquarters in Addis Ababa, a request that was simply ignored.

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By Martin R. Rupiya

Why Rwanda’s development model wouldn’t work elsewhere in Africa

Rwanda is often touted as an example of what African states could achieve if only they were better governed. Out of the ashes of a horrific genocide, President Paul Kagame has resuscitated the economy, curtailed corruption and maintained political stability.

This is a record that many other leaders can only dream of, and has led to Rwanda being cited as an economic success story that the rest of the continent would do well to follow.

In countries like Kenya and Zimbabwe some have argued that their leaders should operate more like Kagame. In other words, that job creation and poverty alleviation are more important than free and fair elections.

In response, critics have sought to puncture Kagame’s image by pointing to human rights violations committed under his leadership. This is an important concern. But the notion that the Rwandan model should be exported also suffers from a more fundamental flaw: it would not work almost anywhere else because the necessary conditions – political dominance and tight centralised control of patronage networks – do not apply.

The Rwandan model

Many of the achievements of Kagame and his governing Rwandan Patriotic Front party are impressive. He took over a deeply divided nation in desperate need of economic and political reconstruction in 1994. Since then, Kagame has established firm personal control over Rwandan politics, generating the political stability needed for economic renewal.

Instead of sitting back and waiting for foreign investors and the “market” to inspire growth, the new administration intervened directly in a process of state directed development. Most notably, his government kick started economic activity in areas that had previously been stagnating by investing heavily in key sectors. It has done so through party-owned holding companies such as Tri-Star Investments.

Combined with the careful management of agriculture, these policies generated economic growth of around 8% between 2001 and 2013. Partly as a result, the percentage of people living below the poverty line fell from 57% in 2005 to 45% in 2010. Other indicators of human development, such as life expectancy and literacy, have also improved.

An example for Africa?

Despite the impressive headline figures, a number of criticisms have been levelled at the Rwandan model.

Most obviously, it sacrifices basic human rights – such as freedom of expression and freedom of association – to sustain the ruling party’s political hegemony. The Rwandan system therefore involves compromising democracy for the sake of development. That decision may be an easy one to make for those who enjoy political power, but is often rejected by the opposition.

Less obviously, the use of party-owned enterprises to kick start business activity places the ruling party at the heart of the economy. It also means that when the economy does well, the already dominant Rwandan Patriotic Front is strengthened. This empowers Kagame to determine who is allowed to accumulate economic power, which in turn undermines the ability of opposition leaders and critics to raise funds.

These arguments have been around for some time. But they have done little to dampen the allure of the Rwandan model for some commentators and leaders.

Given this, the strongest argument against exporting the Rwandan model is not that it is undemocratic and gives the ruling party tremendous economic power. It’s that it won’t actually work.

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