Preventing extremism in West and Central Africa Lessons from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria

Efforts aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) have emerged onto the global stage with unprecedented speed and attracted substantial financial investment. This is unsurprising – the idea that action can be taken to eliminate the potential for devastating violence before it is perpetrated brings great hope and inspiration. While efforts to contain terrorist violence continue on other fronts – military, security, and criminal justice – P/CVE offers the potential to address factors directly associated with extremism and to energise action to address structural and development problems that contribute to the grievances associated with extremist actions. The past few years have witnessed the rapid expansion of P/CVE initiatives. This has been enabled by significant financial investments from international donors combined with actions by local individuals and organisations to address the problems that affect them. High expectations have been created for P/CVE, notwithstanding its obvious complexities and on-going debates about the meaning of the concept, its range and scope, and its expected outcomes. Global, regional and national policies offer substantive guidance on the content and actions that could be taken. However, a great deal depends on the translation of the theories and ideas associated with P/CVE into practical efforts, and how these actions are designed to achieve their intended results. This practical question was the focus of this study, which reviewed selected P/CVE projects in six countries in West and Central Africa. The study is designed to present an understanding of how programme designers and implementers are giving meaning to the concept of preventing violent extremism (PVE), as described in the policies discussed below. It is intended to contribute to the growing body of information about P/CVE, and promote an effective evidence-based approach to addressing terrorism. Importantly, the study seeks to understand how programme activities have been designed to achieve results that relate to the prevention, or even reduction, of violent extremism, as described in PVE policy. Many of the projects covered by the study are still active, and thus this report can offer only a snapshot of their current state. It is not within the scope of the report to analyse the results of the projects. Similarly, no commentary is offered on the projects’ impact on specific dynamics relating to violent extremism. Rather, the report offers observations on the design, implementation and evaluation of interventions, and recommendations for promoting more evidence-based P/CVE policies and practices. It focuses on broad trends rather than the experiences of specific organisations or projects. The report focuses on six countries in West Africa and the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. A similar study is being conducted in four countries in East Africa and the Horn of Africa: Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Those findings will be reported separately. The acronym P/CVE is used throughout this report to refer to interventions that might have features of both preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE and CVE).

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Rebel Incursion Exposes Chad’s Weaknesses

An early February incursion by the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) into Chad from Libya was halted by French air strikes, conducted in coordination with the Chadian army. This most severe security threat for several years highlights the weakness of the country and President Idriss Déby’s rule.

What happened?

On 3-6 February 2019, at the request of N’Djamena, planes from the French Operation Barkhane proceeded with a series of strikes against a group of Chadian rebels in the north east of the country. According to rebels’ spokesperson Youssouf Hamid Ishagh, the Union of Resistance Forces (Union des forces de la résistance – UFR), a coalition based in Libya, intended to reach the capital N’Djamena in order to overthrow President Idriss Déby and “set up a transitional government uniting all of the country’s forces”. The plan was aborted following the French intervention. Composed mainly of Zaghawa fighters from Déby’s own ethnic community, this rebel movement is directed by Timan Erdimi, the president’s nephew, who lives in Qatar. He first tried to overthrow his uncle in 2008, and again in 2009 after forming the UFR.

According to a statement released by the Chadian army on 9 February 2019, “more than 250 terrorists, including four leaders” were captured, and over forty of their vehicles destroyed. These figures were refuted by Ishagh, who described them as fanciful.

Paris defended its intervention, conducted “in response to a request from Chadian authorities”, and justified it by the need to preserve stability in both Chad and the sub-region. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves le Drian declared in front of parliament on 12 February that “France intervened militarily to prevent a coup d’Etat”. French authorities added that Chad is a strategic ally whose army is deployed in operations against terrorism in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.

What is the link with Chad’s domestic context?

By asking France’s military forces to intervene on his territory for the first time since 2008, President Déby showed that he took the risk very seriously. This is due to a domestic situation marked by growing social upheaval, but also to burgeoning dissent within his own ethnic community, which the rebels hope to exploit.

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