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How long does Ivory Coast political actors’ memory last? A decade! Implications of pressions on Ouattara to seek third term after PM’s death

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Sorina Toltica is a PhD Researcher based at University of Portsmouth, School of Area Studies, History, Politics and Literature.

Her current work is funded by the South Coast Doctoral Training Partnership and analyses remoteness & counterinsurgency in Western Africa, with a particular focus on UK&US military presence; Has previously worked for West Africa Network for Peacebuilding Senegal (WANEP), on the Early Warning and Early Response Network (WARN).

According to REUTERS, leaders from Ivory Coast’s ruling party agreed at a closed-door meeting to press President Alassane Ouattara to seek a third term in October’s election following the sudden death of Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly.

This is worrying news, although Ouattara announced in March that he would not stand for re-election after 10 years in office and designated Gon Coulibaly, his closest political ally as the RHDP party’s candidate. While waiting for further developments of the situation, the below summary of the 2010-2011 Ivory Coast Crisis aims to remind political actors that such decision would destabilise the country, which has seen a positive evolution during the past decade (Fragile States Index). It will cause unnecessary instability and a possible international escalation, due to previous ECOWAS and AU inability to manage the crisis and the subsequent requirement of UN and French intervention. The findings below are part of my MA dissertation analysing ECOWAS’s role as a security actor. At the time of writing in 2017, I concluded that regionalisation took place without much integration in Western Africa. Although the first to respond in case of unrest within the African continent, the two regional organisations did not have the capacity or support to act in time of conflict. Despite a push for democratisation, leaders were unwilling to instrumentalise the policies for regional integration they have collectively agreed to, the lack of commitment and political will resulting in a vacuum of authority and capacity, as well as vulnerability to regional dominant powers and external influences.

 

2010-2011 Ivory Coast Crisis

The conflict escalated between December 2010 and April 2011, causing numerous casualties, refugees and human rights violations. Peaceful protests and rallies pro each side took place in Abidjan before the breakout of the violent conflict. The most significant took place on 8th of March, the International Day of Women, where 45 000 women protested across the country against Gbagbo decision and his forces (Reuters, 2011).

Laurent Gbagbo’s forces have been responsible of numerous attacks, murders, rape and kidnapping of opponents. On 17th of March 2011, up to 30 people were killed in a rocket attack on a pro-Ouattara suburb of Abidjan. Nonetheless, Ouattara’s forces have been accused by Human Rights Watch of burning villages in the west of the country and carrying out attacks on civilians, including the raping and killing of alleged Gbagbo supporters (ICRtoP, 2011).

On 28 March, the New Forces renamed the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (RFCI), launched a full-scale offensive across the country. According to the International committee of the Red Cross, 800 people were reported to have been killed in Duékoué alone. Although the responsibility for the massacre was unclear, the UN blamed the RFCI for the deaths (BBC, 2011). Heavy fighting took place in Abidjan, culminating with the arrest of Gbagbo on April 11, 2011, with the help of UN and French forces.

The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has reported that over 1000 civilians were dead as results of the clashes between the two fighting parts and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees declared that almost one million people were displaced within the country, over 150 000 Ivoirians having fled to neighbouring Liberia out of fear of violence (UNHCR, 2011).

Regional and International Reactions

ECOWAS and the AU have responded to the crisis through mediation and diplomatic pressure. Although desired, an ECOWAS or African Union military intervention has been impossible due to multiple reasons, such as lack of capacity and legitimacy. During the 7th of December ECOWAS Extraordinary Summit under the presidency of the Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan, the organisation confirmed the electoral results given by the CEI and endorsed by the UN, asking Gbagbo to step down immediately (Darracq, 2011-2012, p. 363). In attempting to solve the conflict, ECOWAS sent a mediation team formed by the Presidents of Benin, Cap-Vert, Sierra Leone on 28th of December 2010 and 3rd of January 2011 to meet the protagonists of the Ivorian crisis and convince Gbagbo to step down and accept the results of the election. The team did not succeed, although it offered Gbagbo exile abroad and a monthly stipend if he stepped down (ICRtoP, 2011). ECOWAS envisaged the option of using force since 24th of December, where in an official declaration stated that an intervention is possible if the negotiations are not successful (ECOWAS, 2010).

Within a few weeks, the military intervention became justified, given the evolution of the crisis into a violent conflict. During two December and January meetings between all the ECOWAS member states’ Chiefs of Staff of the Army, plans were discussed for an intervention. Nigeria officially demanded on 24th of January for a resolution of the UN Security Council allowing ECOWAS to use force in Ivory Coast if negotiations failed (Darracq, 2011-2012, p. 363). However, several obstacles made a military intervention. Within the organisation, opposing positions started to appear between Nigeria and Ghana. Whereas Nigeria supported an intervention due to its desire to project itself as a dominant regional power, Ghana announced since early January that it will stay neutral in the conflict and will not provide any help in an intervention. Some commentators argue that the reason behind Ghana’s reticence is the similarity between the socialist ideology of the leading parties, the Ivorian Popular Front and the National Democratic Congress of Ghana. Lacking resources and support from one of the biggest providers of military force in the region and the army still being loyal to Gbagbo, the intervention has been considered by the West African Chiefs of Army as logistically delicate (read impossible).

At international level, the UN Security Council never approved an ECOWAS intervention. From the permanent members, China and Russia have expressed their concerns regarding the state sovereignty and did not authorise the use of force. In addition, Nigeria’s will to support the intervention has decreased during the first months of 2011, given its ill-equipped army, the April 2011 national legislative elections requiring a large deployment (Darracq, 2011-2012, p. 365) but also the raising instability in the North caused by the Boko Haram insurgency.

Without military intervention, ECOWAS was left with the only option of diplomatic pressure. The organisation has suspended Ivory Coast’s membership on 7th of December 2010. In further declarations, the organisations urged the UN Security Council to strengthen the UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire)[1] mandate and to adopt stronger targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his supporters and stated that it would “actively support any action to bring the perpetrators to justice at the appropriate time” (ICRtoP, 2011).

Within the African Union, South Africa’s reticence on condemning Gbagbo highlighted that the organisation lacks political consensus and was able to intervene in the crisis just by diplomatic means. The AU sent former president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya to hold talks between Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. On 28th of January 2011, the AU’s Peace and Security Council established a High-Level Panel that was mandated to evaluate the crisis and formulate a solution. On 4th of March, the Panel proposed the formation of a government of national unity while an “honourable exit was found for incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo” (ICRtoP, 2011).

However, Gbagbo rejected the proposition. AU’s diplomatic weakness can be justified by the divergent position of South Africa, the regional dominant power within the organisation. The country remained silent until January 21st, when the President Jacob Zuma expressed his new position, declaring that it is too early to establish a winner of the elections,thus defying the UN endorsement of the first results. In this case, South-African foreign policy was marked by the a strong anti-imperialist position of the African National Congress (ANC), motivated by the presence of UN and French troops. Furthermore, by invoking the issue of national sovereignty, it reinforced relations with Russia and China in its newly BRICS membership [2].

The UN Response

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1962 on 20th of December 2010, extending the mandate of UNOCI until June 30, 2011 and provided additional troops and personnel support to the mission (UN, 2010). In its fourteenth special session held on December 23rd, 2010, the Human Rights Council passed a Resolution condemning the human rights violations (ICRtoP, 2011).

The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck issued two joint statements on the political crisis. The first, dating 29th of December 2010, reported human rights violations by inflammatory speech inciting to violence by Gbagbo and its supporters (UN, 2010). The second statement, issues on 29th of January 2011 warned “about the possibility of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Côte d’Ivoire […] urgent steps should be taken, in line with the responsibility to protect” (UN, 2011).

Following a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Security Council unanimously voted on 19th of January 2011 to send an additional 2 000 UNOCI forces in the country. UNOCI deployed forces to the Hotel du Golf to protect Ouattara and his Government (UN, 2011). Following the deadly 17th of March attack, the UN issued a statement saying that the shelling was “an act, perpetrated against civilians, [that] could constitute a crime against humanity” (UN, 2011). The Resolution A/HRC/16/33 adopted on 25 March decided to dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate the allegations of human rights violations (ICRtoP, 2011).

On 30th of March, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975 was issued, urging all Ivorian parties to respect the will of the people and the election of Alassane Ouattara as President of Ivory Coast, as recognised by ECOWAS, the African Union and the rest of the international community and reiterated that UNOCI could use all necessary measures in its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of attack (UN, 2011, p. 2). It issued targeted sanctions on Gbagbo and his inner circle, which in addition to the ones imposed by the EU and US, had a direct effect on Gbagbo, as he was found in the position of not being able to pay its fighters. Military sources declared that an estimated 50 000 members of the gendarmerie and armed forces had deserted, with only some 2 000 Gbagbo loyalists remaining (Times, 2011).

On April 4th, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement in response to the seizure of Duékoué and subsequent attack where he expressed his concern about the deteriorating security situation and indicated that the violence resulted in a heavy toll on the civilian population. As Gbagbo loyalists launched targeted attacks against UNOCI peacekeepers, the Secretary-General instructed UNOCI to “take the necessary measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population, with the support of the French forces pursuant to paragraph 17 of Security Council Resolution 1962 (2010)” in an effort to protect civilians in Abidjan (UN, 2011).

On April 11, 2011 pro-Ouattara forces assisted by French special forces captured Gbagbo and placed him, his wife, and 50 supporters under arrest. Ouattara was sworn in as the new president of the Ivory Coast on 6th of May 2011.

[1] UNOCI is a 2004-2017 UN peacekeeping mission whose objective is “to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003”, which aimed to end the Ivorian Civil War.

[2] BRICS is an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Sources:

BBC. (2011, April 3). Ivory Coast: Battle for Abidjan intensifies. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12946018

Darracq, V. (2011-2012). Jeux de puissance en Afrique : le Nigeria et l’Afrique du Sud face à la crise ivoirienne. Politique étrangère, 361-374.

ECOWAS. (2010, December 24). Session Extraordinaire de la Conference des Chefs D’Etat et de Gouvernement sur la Cote D’Ivoire. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from ECOWAS: http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=193&lang=fr&annee=2010

ICRtoP. (2011). The Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast

Reuters. (2011, March 8). Ivorian women in anti-Gbagbo march through Abidjan. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from Reuters: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ivorycoast-women-idUKLNE72706R20110308

Smith, D. (2010, December 21). Death squads attacking Ivory Coast opposition, claims spokesman. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/21/ivory-coast-gbagbo-death-squads-claim

Times. (2011, April 1). Rebelswonder: Where Did Gbagbo Go? Retrieved June 21, 2017, from Times: http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2011/04/ 01/rebels-wonder-where-did-gbagbo-go

UN. (2010, December 29). UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Côte d’ Ivoire. Retrieved June 29, 2017, from UN: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Special%20Advisers’%20Statement%20on%20Cote%20d’Ivoire,%2029%20.12.2010.pdf

UN. (2010, December 20). UN Security Council Resolution 1962. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UN: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1962(2010)

UN. (2011, April 4). As Côte d’Ivoire Plunges into Violence, Secretary-General Says United Nations Undertakes Military Operation to Prevent Heavy Weapons Use against Civilians. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UN: https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13494.doc.htm

UN. (2011, January 29). Statement attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UN: http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20Cote%20d’Ivoire,%2019%20Jan%202011.pdf

UN. (2011, January 11). UN Security Council Resolution 1967. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UN: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1967(2011)

UN. (2011, March 30). UN Security Council Resolution 1975. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UN: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975%20%282011%29

UN. (2011, March 18). UN warns deadly shelling of Ivorian market may be crime against humanity. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UN: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37814#.WaQQuyh97IU

UNHCR. (2011). A New Displacement Crisis in West Africa. Retrieved June 21, 2017, from UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4d831f586.html

Ivory Coast’s Presidential Election 2020 – The Gbagbo Factor

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In recent decades Ivory Coast has proved to be something of a bell-weather country for political and economic stability across West Africa, which makes the fact that there is such an alarming knowledge deficit about it in the Anglosphere particularly regrettable. Politically the situation has proved something of a maelstrom, with matters set to intensify in the months leading up to the 2020 Presidential Elections. The trial of the erstwhile President Koudou Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has certainly added to the drama. All this calls for some exploration and examination of the dramatis personae who are shaping events and a redefinition of the political landscape and geopolitical paradigms prior to the 2020 Presidential Elections.

Creation of the RHDP and the Quest for Power

Pivotal to any understanding of the current dynamic lies in appreciating the significance of the strategic alliance that resulted in the RHDP (Rassemblement des Houphouetistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix) founded in Paris in 2005 during the first Ivorian Conflict (2002-2010). The RHDP was founded by reputable members of the political opposition that included Alassane Ouattara of Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) and Henri Konan Bedie of the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), who had been President of Ivory Coast from 1993-1999. This alliance’s primary objective was to topple the then President, Koudou Laurent Gbagbo with the military support of former rebels led by Guillaume Kigbafori Soro, allegedly backed by some neighbouring countries including Burkina Faso under its then President Blaise Compaoré and the active connivance and support of the French. The RHDP finally took power in 2011 after the bloody post-election crisis in which President Gbabgo had initially refused to accept defeat.

The 2010 Presidential Elections were marked by allegations of irregularities emanating from all sides. Whilst not unique to Africa, such accusations are commonplace not least because electoral commissions often lack the staff and resources in order to carry out sufficient monitoring and thus can often come across as paper tigers. Matters were further complicated by the fact that the disarmament of the former rebels of Guillaume Soro (then an ally of Alassane Ouattara) had not been totally achieved, a significant factor as they controlled some 60% of the country that included the entire north, much of the west, the centre and part of the east, as for the south that was under the control of the Gbagbo regime. Undoubtedly such a situation could have lent itself to irregularities, and certainly helped drive the rumour mill. Towns and cities under the control of former rebels appeared to have more voters than there were registered voters and there were stories of voter intimidation, especially of those intending to vote for candidates other than Ouattara. Whilst verification of such incidents was not always possible, a number were confirmed by national and international observers. The Opposition also accused the Gbagbo regime of having committed irregularities in some of the poll centres in the areas under its control. Clearly there are questions as to whether the election should have been conducted in such an unsatisfactory and seemingly partisan situation. Elections by their very nature tend to lead to a febrile atmosphere and certainly events in Ivory Coast were going to become all more frenetic and potentially volatile following what happened after the first round of voting in the Presidential Elections. An extraordinary thing happened with one candidate, Ouattara, who was initially in third place behind Gbagbo and Bedie being permitted to proceed to the 2nd round after 600,000 votes were apparently added to his total to the detriment of Bedie who was then knocked out of the Presidential race. Bedie gave way with a reasonable degree of good grace, after having been believed to have succumbed to external pressure and promises connected with the RHDP. Such goings on provided grounds for suspicion among Gbabgo supporters who voiced their indignation about the safety and validity of the results of the 2nd round to the Electoral Commission (CEI), which itself was suspected by them being in cahoots with the Opposition. Indeed, each party issued a statement about the vote (Procès Verbal) that invariably included their concerns that needed to be harmonized with those of the Electoral Commission before the results could be announced. Allegedly, even this was not condcuted properly according to disgruntled Gbagbo supporters. Tension was rising, especially in the Gbagbo camp where there was growing suspicion that a stitch-up was in process. When it was discovered that the results were to be announced in the hotel that had been serving as Ouattara’s campaign base with the approval of the International community this seemed to add insult to injury, doubly so as Ouattara was to be announced as winner. Gbagbo and his supporters refused to accept the results. Whilst offering to; “Let’s sit and discuss” Gbabgo voiced the need for a re-run of the election, something Ouattara and his supporters simply would not countenance. A stalemate existed, one that had the potential to paralyse the country or worse. The two camps declared their own results, Ouattara through the Electoral Commission recognized by the international community and Gbagbo through the Constitutional Council recognized by the People of Ivory Coast: Electoral Commission – Koudou Laurent Gbagbo 46% Alassande Ouattara 54% Constitutional Council – Koudou Laurent Gbagbo 51% Alassande Ouattara 49% Each candidate went on to hold their own Presidential Inaugurations. The situation was intolerable and soon Ivory Coast found itself on the slippery slope to civil war. Reflecting on the tragic events of 2010 onwards there is every likelihood that Gbagbo would not have won the Presidential Election, especially given the recent configurations in Ivorian politics are taken into consideration, as these indicate that alliances are necessary for victory. Indeed, if Bedie had progressed to the 2nd round he could have been supported by Ouattara and Soro according to the purpose of the RHDP and thus seriously challenge Gbagbo who, despite his popularity was suffering from the wearing effect of being in power almost 11 years. Gbagbo’s tenure in office had been strongly disturbed by a rebellion sponsored from abroad, and he was dogged by allegations of corruption, cronyism, scandals and mismanagement which constituted a body of reasons why the average Ivorian might opt for an Opposition candidate. Sometimes being in power gives the illusion that it will not cease whatever the circumstances. This is what appears to be happening to the RHDP currently. However, due to the major concerns and allegations of massive fraud which undoubtedly changed the course of the events, the best solution would have been to discuss such matters seriously and if necessary cancel the elections and resume it within the timeframe allowed by the Constitution as happened in Kenya with the Presidential Elections opposing the incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta to his challenger Raila Odinga. In 2010 various African and international leaders prevailed upon the Ivorian President to accept the results of the election, but instead his intransigence exacerbated matters and fuelled loyalist versus opposition violence on an alarming scale. A UN authorised military mission, which saw unprecedented involvement by the French, was instrumental in seeing Gbagbo removed from power. According to some credible sources there may have been a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between Alassane Ouattara, Henri Konan Bedie and Guillaume Kigbafori Soro to give both political and military support for Ouattara to become the Ivorian President and then ensure a peaceful transition of power to the party of Bedie in 2020 by supporting the PDCI’s designated candidate for the Presidential Elections just as Bedie had done for Ouattara twice before in the Presidential Elections of 2010 and 2015. The current President apparently is bound by a similar promise made to Soro, who was perceived at the time as a successor to President Ouattara among leaders hailing from the influential Northern Region. Indeed, Soro was the President of the National Assembly and could constitutionally replace Ouattara in exceptional circumstances such as his becoming physically or mentally incapacitated, dismissal/impeachment, resignation, delegation of power, resignation or death in office. Soro’s rebellion against the regime of former President Gbagbo, his military success in 2011 and the various key positions that he has occupied at a state level have added to his credentials. In addition, Soro has a very significant standing among the peoples of the north of the country, he has some powerful connections to allies in Ouattara’s own RDR who view the former rebel leader as a natural successor to Ouattara. Unfortunately, the RHDP promises on which the alliance was made are very difficult to respect, after all you cannot reasonably promise the same thing to two persons.

Dismantling of the RHDP

There is an Ivorian saying that states that – Power cannot be shared like a public bench, and this in many ways underscores the realities facing that RHDP alliance. Realpolitik and power management have resulted in the alliance proving to be inefficient and difficult to sustain. President Ouattara in an attempt to strengthen his hand and that of the RDR (his own political party) has worked progressively to reduce the influence of his two allies. A year after his re-election in 2015 Ouattara pressed for the adoption of a new constitution which practically disqualified Soro from any possible chance of succeeding him as President of the Republic. Mutinies by former rebels supposedly encouraged by Soro periodically took place in January through to May 2017 and shook the country and were an expression of the anger (and intended to be a threat) felt in response to the said constitutional change. Since then Ouattara and Soro have engaged in a serious battle of wills, a battle that has become ever more intense as 2020 approaches. Furthermore, Bedie soon appreciated that Ouattara would not necessarily support his candidature (as the PDCI candidate) for the 2010 elections. Bedie’s suspicion was aroused when Ouattara suggested that the RHDP alliance be dissolved and instead become a unified party that would select the most suitable candidate to stand for the 2020 Presidential Elections. Such a suggestion, even it was genuine at first, was perceived by Bedie and the PDCI as a ruse by which Ouattara would engineer the promotion of a candidate from his own political party the RDR to the detriment of the PDCI. The PDCI was so outraged by Ouattara’s proposals that it decided to withdraw from the RHDP in August 2018 and prepare its own path to return to power, something it had last held in December 1999.

Confronted by the refusal of Bedie to go along with his scheme Ouattara turned to Soro in a search for an alternative heavyweight political supporter, urging him to register with the RHDP or face deselection as President of the National Assembly, hardly an overture likely to be met with a positive response. Ouattara and his supporters, stemming largely from the RDR and other affiliated parties, launched the unified party of the RHDP with himself at the helm at a congress held on 26th January 2019. Unsurprisingly, in view of their past history Soro refused Ouattara’s ‘offer’ and was forced to resign as President of the National Assembly on 8th February 2019. Undefiant, Soro has become part of the opposition and is rallying his supporters for the Presidential Elections through his new political movement – Le Comité Politique. Whilst Soro has a goodly body of support, it is important to note that there are many Ivorians, especially outside his traditional powerbase in the north of the country, who feel that they can never entirely trust or vote for the former rebel leader. Thus, making alliances look like the only way forward for Soro, and even then, these are not assured in the currrent political climate.

With only a year to crucial elections Ouattara had managed to alienate two principal allies who could themselves find a surprising ally in the form of the former President, Koudou Laurent Gbagbo – a classic case of my enemy’s enemy is my friend. The shifting sands of politics being such that certain past enmities if not forgotten are often overlooked, or at least put to one side. Gbagbo having been acquitted by the ICC has already held a historic and possibly decisive meeting on 29th July 2019 with Bedie in Belgium – oh to have been a fly on the wall. The nature of such meetings and possible political machinations have heightened the nervousness of the Ouattara regime and has resulted in increased surveillance of opposition parties and a crackdown on critics, especially those associated with Ouattara’s two former allies. The crackdown and the growing paranoia of the Ouattara regime has led to a growing sense of nervousness, among the population in general, and especially amongst supporters of the regime. In public administration where Ouattara loyalists and supporters invariably ‘rewarded’ with posts and preferment over those sympathies lie elsewhere there is growing concern. Another dangerous undercurrent is the matter of ethnicity, something that is never far below the surface of Ivorian politics and public life. In the private sector access to finance or markets is difficult for those not perceived as Ouattara supporters, with anecdotal evidence of foreign clients and potential investors being actively steered towards those whom the regime happens to deem politically friendly. The Central Government has become extremely slow to make payments to local suppliers for fear that such funds might be used to help finance opposition parties.

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