The International Security Echo-Chamber: Getting Civil Society Into the Room

There is a deadly paradox at the heart of international policymaking: external interventions carried out in the name of security often end up undermining peace and security. The United States, European countries, the United Nations, and others are backing military, technical, financial, and diplomatic “security” initiatives all over the world, but their efforts often end up worsening and perpetuating the conflicts they are supposed to stop or prevent. All the while, the people worst affected have very little say about what’s going on around them. Of course, these two problems are closely connected. In response, many peace and rights activists around the world are considering how to change the dynamic and ensure people affected by conflict are listened to in the debates that shape international security interventions.

Security Failure in an Age of Impunity

International Rescue Committee Chief Executive David Miliband has dubbed this moment in history the “age of impunity.” This month, the Italian government arresteda ship’s captain. The crime? Rescuing drowning migrants, whom Libyan coast guards backed by the European Union are supposed to drag back to detention camps rife with sexual torture and severe abuse. In U.S. migrant detention facilities, children are subject to “extreme cold temperatures, lights on 24 hours a day, no adequate access to medical care, basic sanitation, water, or adequate food.”

In the name of peace and stability, the U.N. and its member states provide intelligence, logistics, and financial support to the armies of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad for counter-terror operations that consistently involve serious human rights violations that feed into further conflict. Despite its significant U.N. and EU backing, the African Union Mission in Somalia remains similarly heavy-handed.

As wars on terror and irregular migration have intensified, so have armed rebellions and forced displacement. As a bipartisan task force of prominent former U.S. policymakers recently observed:

Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased fivefold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled … at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers.

The post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq are also thought to have directly killed at least 480,000 people, and the world is now dealing with record levels of forced displacement.

In sum, security interventions are consistently failing at great cost. Yet governments tend to respond not by changing course and refocusing on addressing root causes, but with further investments in walls, border guards, special forces, train-and-equip programs, and remote warfare that all serve to perpetuate the cycle of violence.

Shutting Out Civil Society

One reason why hard security responses still dominate despite their poor track record is that even governments who pride themselves on “listening” to civil society and promoting peace and freedom are actually remarkably closed to alternative ways of thinking about security and foreign policy.

Yes, there are discussions on considering human rights while combating terrorism, or on making the EU’s worryingly militarized new “peace” facility more sensitive to conflict, or even on giving countering/preventing violent extremism (C/PVE) approaches more of a peacebuilding/development spin. But the big decisions – such as throwing U.N. support behind counter-terror wars in Mali and Somalia, prioritizing counter-terrorism and migration control above more holistic peace and stability strategies, tightening counter-terror laws, or arming, funding, and legitimizing reckless strongmen like Libya’s General Khalifa Haftar – these decisions always seem to be made with zero or negligible input from communities and civil society.

For organizations that want to research and challenge international security strategies, there are few funds available. Recent failures such as those catalogued above should mean greater appetite for critical perspectives in foreign and security policy debates, but few governments and foundations fund those who offer fresh perspectives and critical feedback. Most seem content with international and local civil society organizations echoing their buzzwords and priorities, or offering technical ideas on “best practices.” Civil society organizations that want to be included in higher-level discussions often feel they are supposed to leave critical perspectives on things like C/PVE at home.

This kind of echo chamber does not lend itself to improved security interventions, but to groupthink where the same flawed approaches persist despite their clear faults.

The muting of critical voices in international policy debates is not unrelated to the situation in repressive and unstable contexts, where civil society is fighting for its lifeOver half of U.N. member states now actively curtail people’s freedoms. The laws and rhetoric used to counter terrorism and “violent extremism” are increasingly being used to crush opposition.

As limited funding opportunities push them toward supporting donor governments’ perspectives, many civil society organizations, including youth and women’s groups, face pressure to buy into C/PVE – and embrace that flawed “soft side” of the war on terror – rather than abandon efforts to promote security entirely. These funding pressures serve to mute civil society criticism of prevailing security policies at a time when opposition to repression is being ever more rapidly dismantled in the name of counter-terrorism, under the watching eyes of Europe and the United States.

The bottom line: international security policy follows the same old patterns, and repeats the same old mistakes, and people all over the world bear the consequences.

Getting Civil Society Voices Heard

A few months ago, our organizations – SaferworldFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and Rethinking Security – started reaching out to like-minded organizations around the world to discuss what is wrong with security policies and interventions, and what we should do in response. The conversation immediately generated a buzz – people were excited to find ways for civil society to push back. We were overwhelmed by the remarkably similar stories from organizations working on opposite ends of the world, thousands of miles apart.

We heard how “peacebuilding and conflict transformation approaches are becoming sidelined by security responses,” and how “counterterrorism laws, regulations and policies lead to shrinking space” for alternative solutions. One of our partners in Asia told us that “C/PVE discourse in our region has been weaponized against legitimate dissent and civil society space” to operate.

One of the biggest concerns was the way “P/CVE restricts resources for grassroots civil society organizations, with women’s rights organizations particularly affected.” Given that the only funding available to many such organisations is for P/CVE, as another partner told us, “a key concern is instrumentalization – undermining women and girls’ rights, and restricting support for local women’s rights organizations.” Many activists had feared they were alone in their concerns about these trends, with some simply having given up on trying to push back.

In June in Berlin, dozens of civil society groups got together to share these and other concerns over mainstream international security policy. The group combined both critical voices from countries badly affected by current trends such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, and those working on security policy in Western policy centers such as Washington, New York, London, and Brussels. They came to consider one major question: how can civil society promote security policy alternatives more effectively?

Read more on Just Security

Why is the UK going to Mali?

In one of her last acts as British Defence Secretary, Penny Mordaunt announced 250 troops will be deployed to support the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, but for this to be effective it needs a more coherent strategy for engagement in the Sahel and Africa with clear objectives and resources.

Amidst the flurry of a new British Prime Minister and Cabinet, it was easy to miss the Government’s announcement that they are deploying a long-range reconnaissance task group of 250 personnel to Mali in 2020. But it is important. Not only does it represent the most significant contribution of British forces to the frontline of a UN peacekeeping mission since Bosnia, it could also potentially be the most dangerous mission for British forces since Afghanistan – the French military has lost over 24 soldiers since it commenced Operation Barkhane in Mali in 2013.

It also follows a continued commitment from the UK to tackle instability in the Sahel. As Mordaunt notes: “[t]he UK is committed to supporting the international community in combating instability in Mali, as well as strengthening our wider military engagement across the Sahel region.” In September 2018, the UK announced its support to Operation Barkhane with the much-lauded deployment of Royal Air Force Chinook helicopters. This is on top of the £49.5 million of funding it has already provided to the UN mission as part of an increased presence in the region. With “new embassies in Niger and Chad and … a much larger presence in Mali”, including around 90 troops already embedded in the various international peace operations and a new Defence Attaché position.

This support is part of the UK’s new approach to Africa. In a speech in Cape Town in September 2018, Theresa May announced that as part of five shifts in the UK’s approach, it “will invest more in countries like Mali, Chad and Niger that are waging a battle against terrorism in the Sahel.” The reason for this renewed focus is likely to be threefold. It’s good for its bilateral relations with France (a priority in recent years, especially since the vote to leave the EU) who already has around 3,500 troops deployed to the country; it demonstrates its commitment to UN peacekeeping missions (strengthening the UK’s identity as ‘Global Britain’); and builds the British armed forces’ reputation as a willing and able partner in the fight against international terrorism. However, it remains unclear how well the UK’s broader strategy on the continent can adapt to this shift towards the Sahel.

In her evidence session with the Foreign Affairs Committee in March this year, Harriet Baldwin – the then-Africa Minister – was criticised for her description of the UK’s commitments in Africa as a ‘strategy’. Instead, Bob Seely suggested it amounted to “effectively a bunch of bullet points.” This reflected our own conversations with soldiers on the ground in Kenya and Mali (and those rotating out of Nigeria) in September 2018 last year, who had their own concerns about the strategic direction being provided to soldiers operating on the continent.

One soldier, echoing the views of others, described the UK approach as “throwing some men here and some men there” and felt that “political vacillation” remained a major threat to the effectiveness of the UK’s approach. Although there is evidence that efforts are underway to start improving the integration of these strategies, our research found that coordination remained personality-driven rather than institutionalised.

Moreover, it was argued that these activities remained largely “dictated by funding” rather than careful analysis of partners’ wants and needs. Many soldiers delivering training courses arguedthat they did not address the institutional problems which were causing instability in the countries in which they were engaged. One, reflecting the feelings of many more, said: “We just end up training people, sending them out, and never hearing anything again.” In Kenya, a number of soldiers argued that UK operations were not “actually [going to] achieve anything.” Instead, they suggested that the UK is doing just enough to stop things getting worse or to look like it is doing something.

If not carefully thought through, the UK deployment to the Sahel risks the same, a point British troops are painfully aware of. For example, one soldier in Mali told us that there was a need for “an adult conversation about what [our partners] needs and what we can deliver.” He explained that current training missions resembled a builder that “just turned up at your house and started fixing things you hadn’t asked for.” In some interviews it also appeared that the UK’s shift towards the Sahel had not been combined with a more detailed analysis of what among the many and complex problems facing the region was of most importance to the UK. For instance, soldiers complained that they have not been given clear priorities to cover in their situation reports; leading to a situation where they report on everything – despite feeling it is not that useful and may not even be read by personnel based in London.

No doubt the French Government will be pleased that, as part of its efforts to try and rally regional, local and international actors to support its operations in Mali, the UK is committing further resources. But serious questions need to be asked about how to make this contribution effective. For instance, in our conversations with senior officers we were informed that the UK was still trying to work out what the UK “ask” would be in return for these deployments. And, beyond this, while an extra 250 troops is a significant uplift on what the UK has already committed, it remains small in comparison to larger international and regional efforts – meaning careful consideration is essential to make it effective. 

Nor is the Sahel an easy region for the UK to provide automatic added value with this modest commitment. The Sahel is already a complicated space of disparate efforts by international and regional efforts, many of which are facing serious difficulties. Nor is the UK’s job made any easier, according to a number of British soldiers already deployed in Mali, owing to the fact the British Army is seriously lacking in proficient French language speakers and has limited operational experience in the Sahel region. Taken together, this could undermine the effectiveness and added value of the British contribution.

Faced with these potential challenges, the UK’s deployment must form part of a coherent regional and continent-wide strategy. Indeed, success will be determined by how far the British government is willing to prioritise the activities required to meet its aspirations. Only when bold rhetoric is matched by resources and sustained planning will the UK be able to improve its contribution to peace and stability in the places it intervenes.


Image credit: MINUSMA/Flickr. 


About the authors

Liam Walpole is a Senior Policy Officer at the Remote Warfare Programme.

Abigail Watson is Senior Research Officer at the Remote Warfare Programme.

Originally published on Oxford Research Group